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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fact that they are unsafe does not affect his liability for injuries result-
ing from such conditions. Yet if the defect which caused the injury
was not known to the proprietor and could not have been known in the
exercise of due care the proprietor is not liable. But no duty rests on
the proprietor of a public place of amusement to warn patrons of




AUTOxOBis---LAILiTY op DEALER FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE CoN-
DITION or USED CAR IN CoUmsE or DImONSTRATION.--A salesman in the employ-
ment of the defendant, a dealer in second-hand automobiles, had conveniently,
but without authority, transferred custody of a used car to his wife for the pur-
pose of demonstrating the car to the plaintiff, a prospective purchaser, who was a
sister of the salesman's wife. During the course of the demonstration, one of the
wheels collapsed, and plaintiff was injured in the crash that followed. In an ac-
tion for damages, the defendant contended that the salesman's wife was not his
agent. Held, for defendant, on an instructed verdict. Sandlin v. Hamilton Auto
Sales Co., 197 N. E. 238 (Ohio, 1934).
The plaintiff's complaint was framed in two counts, one charging the defendant
for the negligence of his employee, the second charging him with knowledge of the
defective wheel, as a result of which plaintiff was injured. On the first ground, the
trial court was doubtless correct in finding that, as a matter of law, the relation-
ship of principal and agent did not exist, that the salesman had exceeded the
scope of his authority, and that, therefore, the- defendant was not liable for the
negligence of the substitute driver. There may appear to be a conflict of authority
as to the master's liability for the negligent acts of the substitute driver, but
such conflict is generally resolved on the question of fact whether the servant
had the express or implied authority to thus permit another to act for him.
The query always is, Has the servant acted within the scope of his employment?
In two cases somewhat resembling the state of facts in the principal case it
was held that he had. Thus in Wooding v. Thorn, 132 N. Y. S. 50 (1911), where
the agent had the duty to demonstrate the car for the benefit of the prospective
purchaser and allowed the servant of the latter to drive, it was held the servant
had acted in the scope of his employment. And, in Hoffman v. Roehl, 203 Pac.
349 (Mont. 1921), the master was likewise held liable for the negligence of the
daughter of the prospective purchaser who was permitted to drive the car on an
errand of her own. Without going into the merits of these two cases, the facts
of the principal decision can be readily distinguished. The agent delivered the
car to a party within the immediate household of the buyer, in one case to a
member of the immediate household, in the other to a servant in the employ of
the buyer. The court, in each instance, obviously believed that such act was in
the furtherance of the agent's legitimate employment, that is, the sale of the car to
the prospective buyer. In the case under examination, however, the salesman de-
livered the car without authority to his wife, a person in no legal privity with the
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buyer, whatever the affirmative of that proposition is worth in the above cases
commented on. The fact that the wife was a sister of the prospective buyer seems
entirely irrelevant, and should not change the effect of the salesman's transfer of
the car to her. And, of course, she was not an employee of the dealer. The reader
is recommended to examine, in addition, the numerous factual situations reported
in the Annotations in 20 A. L. R. 194 and 50 A. L. R. 1931, which set forth
other sets of circumstances under which the courts have held the salesman's trans-
fer of the car to another during the demonstration an act within the scope of
his employment.
Some of the courts adopt the idea of constructive identity, in this regard.
Thus is has been held that the acts of one permitted by the servant to operate
the automobile in the latter's presence are the acts of the servant with respect
to the liability of the master therefor. Marchand v. Russell, 241 N. W. 209 (Mich.
1932) ; City of Indianapolis v. Lee, 132 N. E. 605 (Ind. 1921); Irwin v. William-
son Candy Co., 255 N. W. 400 (Mich. 1934); Annotation, 54 A. L. R. 852;
Annotation, 98 A. L. R. 1046. The doctrine certainly could not apply in the
principal case. The well-recognized rule of agency, that the master is not liable'
for the negligent acts of a third person, unless the servant in so allowing him
to act was himself acting within the scope of his employment, would be ap-
plicable. Williams v. Cohen, 206 N. W. 823 (Iowa 1926); Neuman v. Steur-
nagel, 22 Pac. (2d) 780 (Cal. 1933); RESTATEMENT or THE LAW Or AGENCY § 81.
However, the question is (and this Note is mainly directed to this inquiry),
Is the doctrine of respondeat superior correctly applied on the facts? The doc-
trine efficiently enough disposes of the first count. But the second count sets up
matter, although in a poorly framed manner, which, if supported by any evidence,
should have been allowed to go to the jury foi consideration. That count alleges
that "the defendant in error [defendant] knew, or by the exercise of reasonable
and ordinary care should have known, that one of the front wheels upon such
automobile was defective, and by reason of such defect, while being negligently
operated by an employee of and for the benefit of the defendant in error, the
wheel collapsed, which caused the automobile to overturn and injure plaintiff
in error." In the writer's opinion, counsel should have clearly and unambiguously
set up an independent and distinct ground of liability, as, for instance, the de-
fective wheel and the defendant's duty of prior inspection, and have avoided
all reference to the negligence of the defendant's employee. However that may be,
there appears to have been some factual evidence supporting the charge of a
defective wheel. The salesman's wife testified to the peculiar sway of the car
before the accident, witnesses testified as to the dry rotted condition of the
wheel, and of course the very fact that the wheel collapsed under ordinary
driving conditions had some probative value. Usually, wheels do not break of
their own weight. The writer does not wish to appear as passing on the quality
of the evidence or of its persuasiveness. He simply submits that the evidence as
to the wheel should have been submitted to the jury, and the jury should have
been allowed to pass on its weight. He further submits that the doctrine of
respondeat superior was not properly controlling. It is generally agreed that said
doctrine is dependent for its application in any given case on the action of the
servant, negligent or otherwise. Wherever it is applied, the master is held liable for
the negligent action of his servant. Conversely, unless the servant has been negli-
gent, the master cannot be proceeded against. Bennett v. Eagleke, 148 Atl. 197 (N.
J. 1930), and Comment, 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 349. The reader is asked to tax his
imagination sufficiently to conjecture on what ground the Ohio Appellate Court
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would have held defendant liable, if at all, had his salesman personally conducted
the demonstration, the other given facts occurring. It is apparent, assuming no
negligence on the part of the driver, and it is to be noted that it does not ap-
pear in the principal case that the substitute driver was negligent, that there
would have been no call for the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court
would have been driven irresistibly to the only true consideration, to wit, the
duty of the defendant to reasonably inspect his secondhand cars and put them
out on the market in a reasonably safe condition. The probative value of the
evidence going to the defective wheel was not for the court to pass on, and in
the opinion of the writer, both the trial court in directing the verdict, and the ap-
pellate court in affirming that course of action, committed error. The dissenting
jurist alone drew attention to the defective wheel, inferring an analogy to the
manufacturers' cases, and concluding that if the defendant knew of the defect
he should be liable. It should be noted that actual knowledge of a condition such
as a dangerous wheel is not required. The jurist would have been more accurate
if he had placed liability at the defendant's door in the event the latter, in the
exercise of ordinary care, ought to have known of the defect. HARPER, LAW or
ToiRs 243, 246; RETATEMENT or THE LAW OF ToRTs § 402.
Our attention is then narrowed to this inquiry: Should a secondhand dealer,
who has sent out a used caf for demonstration purposes, be liable to the prospec-
tive purchaser injured in the course of the demonstration due to. a dangerously
defective part of the car, irrespective of any application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior? It is impossible and unnecessary to cite cases covering the
specific facts. But principles broad enough to enscope the problem can be pre-
sented. There is first of all, the proposition of law that where a dealer sells an
article to another which is not only unfit for the purpose for which he sells it,
but owing to some defect therein, is dangerous for the use for which it is de-
signed and intended to be used, and such defect was discoverable by the dealer
in the exercise of due care, and not likely to be discovered by the purchaser, the
former is liable to the buyer for injuries resulting to him from the use of the
article. In Gerkin v. Brown & Seher Co., 143 N. W. 48 (Mich. 1913), the pur-
chaser of a fur suffered skin poisoning about the neck due to a dye in the fur
sold by defendant fur dealer, and recovered damages therefor. In Gariey v.
Namm, 121 N. Y. S. 442 (1910), a dealer in ladies' garments was held liable to
a purchaser for injuries caused latter by a concealed needle imbedded in the
garment. While a warranty was alleged in the first case, both decisions were
predicated on the ground of the defendant's negligence in failing to properly
inspect the article. In this type of case the courts frequently adopt the view
that the defendant has impliedly warranted the article as fit for the contemplated
use. Note, 40 HARv. L. Rxv. 886.
The modern tendency is no longer illustrated by the famous case of Winter-
bottom v. Wtight, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842). In the manufacturers' cases, the
courts frankly admit that the producer of an automobile, who fails to use rea-
sonable care in inspecting and testing the car and its parts, is liable to a pur-
chaser injured in an accident caused by a dangerously defective part, without
concerning themselves with the patent lack of privity between manufacturer and
purchaser. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919);
Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 193 N. E. 529 (Ill. 1934). Courts no longer inter-
pose the lack of privity of contract to defeat the plaintiff's claim in this field.
They insist that a prime requisite to the manufacturers' liability be that the
defect is of a part such as will make the automobile a thing of danger to per-
sons who should be expected to come in contact with it while used in a manner
for which it was designed or intended to be used. Cohen v. Brockway Motor
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Truck Corporation, 268 N. Y. S. 545 (1934). The famous and oft quoted case
of MacPherson vt. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. IOSO (1916),
clarified the view of the courts on this proposition, taking the position, now
widely followed, that if the nature of the thing manufactured is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, the
manufacturer owes the purchaser a duty to exercise care in making it even though
the chattel is not necessarily dangerous when properly made. The periodical and
text-book writers point out that the MacPherson case and later New York cases
discard the cumbersome technique of fitting facts into some one of the exceptions
to the general rule of the manufacturer's immunity in the absence of privity.
32 MIcH. L. REv. 1007. Liability is placed squarely on principles of negligence at
common law. The issues resolve themselves into these: Has the defendant the
duty to inspect? Has he breached that duty? And has the plaintiff's -injury been
the proximate result of that breach?
Of course the objection will be at once forthcoming that the manufacturer's
liability must be distinguished. His negligence, it is said, consists of positive
action. Jt is affirmative. In the production of his article, be it a car or some-
thing else, he has installed or used defective parts or materials, dangerous to
life or limb because of the contemplated use of the article. The argument will
doubtless follow, that the used car dealer has done nothing, that, if anything, his
negligence consists of inaction. But that argument is as -outworn as the doctrine
of Winterbottom v. Wright. It is true that the great majority of the cases are
concerned with negligent actors, and that courts are perhaps a little less dis-
posed to place liability on the one whose negligence consists of inaction. How-
ever, a sound public policy is behind the reasoning in the manufacturers' cases
and should likewise be behind those of the nature of the principal case. Needless
to say, the courts hold that there is a duty to inspect.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts (Student edition) covers the situation
in concise language. Section 401 is as follows: "A vendor of a chattel made by
a third person which is bought as safe for use in reliance upon the vendor's
profession of competence and care is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
by the vendor's failure to exercise reasonable competence and care to supply the
chattel in a condition safe for use." In the Comment to this section, the Reporter
draws parlicular attention to the dealer who has kept the article in storage
wherein it is likely to dangerously deteriorate unless properly kept. While this
instance is obviously most pertinent to the meat dealer, query, Should it not
be as applicable to a used car lot? The Reporter further comments on those
cases in which the dealer selects the article wherein the purchaser is entitled to
expect that he will exercise reasonable care in selecting from his stock a specimen
fit for the contemplated use. Query, Has not the dealer in selecting the used car
to be sent out to the prospective purchaser brought himself precisely within this
Comment? That the plaintiff is. but a prospective purchaser cannot anywhere or
in any manner change the dealer's duty to him. Certainly he owes him the
same duty to use care during the course of the demonstration, if not more, than
he would to one who had completed purchase.
It is true that the automobile is not generally regarded as an inherently danger-
ous instrumentality. HuDDY oN AuTomoamEs (7th ed.) 797. Therefore its owneris
not absolutely liable for whatever 'happens, as in the case of ownership of a
ferocious animal, or of high explosives. But it may become a dangerous agency
if equipped with a weak wheel or a defective steering apparatus, and if so
equipped when put out on the market or furnished to a prospective purchaser,
for the use for which it was reasonably intended, it would seem that liability
should attach. Liability in the instant case could certainly not be placed on the
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manufacturer, for the defective wheel was not installed as such by him. Rather
the defect is peculiarly due to a rotted and weakened condition of the wood, a
condition which the dealer in the exercise of reasonable care and by inspection
could have prevented, at least have discovered in time to warn the plaintiff.
That the dealer's negligence has been characterized by inaction does not change
the- dangerous condition of the automobile he has thus allowed to be sent out to
the plaintiff for demonstration purposes. That courts are even tending to attach
strict liability to ownership of automobiles is indicated by the reading of two
recent Florida cases: Miami Transit Co. v. McLin, 133 So. 99 (Fla. 1931); Greene
v. Miller, 136 So. 532 (Fla. 1931). See, also, Annotations in 16 A. L. R. 270 and
68 A. L. R. 1002. The majority holding is contra. Brinkman v. Zuckerman) 192
Mich. 624, 159 N. W. 316 (1916); Fisher v. Fletcher, 133 N. E. 834 (Ind. 1922).
But it is conceded that the automobile may become a per se dangerous agency
if equipped with a weak wheel or a defective steering apparatus for example.
If so equipped when put out on the market or for demonstration to a prospective
purchaser, the secondhand dealer should be chargeable, if not absolutely, at
least in the same manner as liability is placed on the manufacturer, that is, so far
as the defect might have been discovered by a reasonable inspection. That courts
are adopting this public policy is illustrated by the cases. In Fakerty v. Helfont,
122 At]. 180 (Me. 1923), it was held that liability does not arise from the mere
ownership of a defective car where the injury is not 'shown to have been the
result of the defect. In this case, the car was delivered to and was being driven
away by the prospective purchaser's agent at the time of the accident. The
court conceded the general agency proposition that the defendant would not be
liable for any negligence on the part of the buyer's agent, but adds, that "in case
of substances whose dangerous qualities are latent and not obvious, manu-
facturers, vendors, and distributors who negligently fail to inform persons dealing
with them of such qualities are, notwithstanding want of privity, liable for in-
juries caused thereby to persons whose exposure to the danger could have rea-
sonably been contemplated." Certainly if evidence to support the allegations in
the plaintiff's petition in that case that the defective steering wheel was the cause
of his injury had been forthcoming, who will dispute that the court would have
found the defendant liable, nothwithstanding, as it says, "want of privity"?
In this connection it is important to note that the manufacturer or vendor
should be liable only for injuries received by one who uses the article or prepara-
tion in an 6rdinary, expected manner. Genesee County Patrons F. R. Ass'n v.
L. Sonneborn Sons, 189 N. E. 551 (N. Y. 1934); Note, 9 NOTRE DAmm LAWY.
443. Bohlen says that "Where . . . the article can be used only for the very pur-
pose for which it is dangerously unfit and the vendor knows that the purchaser
is buying it, with the intention of putting it at once to such use . . . the courts
should . . . hold the vendor liable for what he must, had he thought, have
realized would probably result from his conduct." BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW
or TORTS 115, 116. That the use of the" car during the course of the demonstra-
tion was an ordinary and expected one is entirely too patent to warrant further
discussion.
In Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 218 N. W. 855 (Wis. 1928), it was held that
the duty of a secondhand dealer to exercise care with respect to its equipment
so that it may be kept in control and not become a menace to life and limb,
is the same as that of the manufacturer of a new car, especially where he has
represented that the car was furnished with standard equipment. It should be
noted that the defendant dealer therein had rebuilt the car and therefore the
case falls in line with the manufacturers' cases. However, as the court remarks,
the duty to carefully, construct is cast on the manufacturer for the purpose of
preserving life and limb.
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Harper, in his work on the Law of Torts (p. 245), states: "Both the manu-
facturer and vendor of an article intended for certain purposes owe a duty to
warn of any concealed defect which is dangerous to life or limb, of which the
manufacturer or vendor has knowledge or of which he should have knowledge,
and which the person for whose use it is intended is not likely to discover."
This Iasi qualification is important. Certainly the prospective purchaser, during
the course of the demonstration, is not likely to discover the dangerously de-
fective wheel, which the dealer in the exercise of careful inspection, should have
discovered. He is not expected to make a detailed inspection of the car; and he
has a right to rely on the judgment and competence of the dealer, and to expect
that a car reasonably safe for the contemplated demonstration would be sent
to him. RESTATEMET op TnE LAW Or TORTS § 401. While the automobile is not
inherently dangerous, its nature and anticipated use is such that it is imminently
dangerous. Jaroniec v. Hasselbarth, 228 N. Y. S. 302 (1928). The secondhand
dealer, having reason to believe that such persons as the plaintiff in the principal
case will come in contact with the car, where he knows or should know, by the
exercise of ordinary diligence, that the vehicle is in an imminently dangerous
condition, should owe such persons a common law duty, and be liable for any
injury suffered because of the dangerous and defective condition of the automo-
bile he has sent out, while the vehicle was being used in a reasonable and ordi-
nary manner. See Annotation, 60 A. L. R. 371, wherein the writer thereof ad-
mits the cases are not in accord with this doctrine of liability, but is of the
opinion that the trend is in that direction.
The case of Schweinhaut v. Flaherty, 49 Fed. (2d) 533 (1931) (commented
on in 7 NoTm DAm- LAWY. 261), is of interest in this connection, further iI-
lustrating the tendency of the courts to adopt a construction more in alignment
with sound public policy, in preference to the alternate of being hidebound by an
overworked rigid rule of law. Therein, it was held by the Court of Appeals of the
MIstrict of Columbia, that the Taxicab Company was liable for one of its
driver's negligence, while the latter was transporting a girl friend free and in
violation of company rules. Despite the fact that the driver was clearly acting
outside the scope of his employment, so that the doctrine of respondeat superior
would not seem to be applicable, the court deemed it good public policy to re-
quire the cab company to hire competent drivers and to use reasonable means to
enforce its rules of safety.
The writer wishes to conclude by remarking that inasmuch as the modern
trend is to put liability firmly on the grounds of common law negligence prin-
ciples where the dealer or manufacturer stands in some relation to an article
which while not inherently dangerous to life and limb, can become so if negligently
made, it must be recognized that an imminently dangerous condition to life and
limb can be caused by negligent omission and failure to inspect carefully, as
well as by negligent installation of a defective part. A like duty must, as a matter
of iublic policy, be imposed in both instances. If in the principal case, then,
the plaintiff's injuries were caused, not by any negligence of the substitute driver,
but by a dangerously defective part of the car, any application 6f the doctrine
of respondeat superior to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action would appear mis-
placed, and evidence going to the defective condition of the wheel should have
been submitted to the jury.
George S. Keller.
